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BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS-

1958 TENNESSEE SURVEY

F. HODGE O'NEAL*

Only a handful of cases were decided in Tennessee during the survey period which raised questions in the field of business associations.
Some of the issues raised in these cases, however, were of considerable
interest and importance.
Power of Minority Shareholders in Close Corporationto Obtain an
Accounting: The most interesting and perhaps the most important
Tennessee decision on a corporation question was Akin v. Mackie'
decided by the Supreme Court of Tennessee. In that case, complainants sought a discovery and an accounting from defendant, the corporation's president, treasurer and majority shareholder. The two
complainants together owned 49 per cent of the corporation's stock,
and defendant owned the remaining 51 per cent. Complainants and
defendant constituted the membership of the corporation's three-man
board of directors. The bill alleged that from the time defendant
acquired the controlling interest in the corporation he was secretive
about its management, that no corporate books were kept after he
acquired control, and that he had stated repeatedly that the business
was fast becoming insolvent and should be adjudged bankrupt. The
bill, however, expressly stated that complainants "impute no dishonesty" to defendant. Defendant demurred to the bill, the demurrer
being interpreted by the court as based on the following grounds:
(1) the bill did not name the corporation as a defendant, and (2) a
minority shareholder cannot have an accounting without first exhausting his legal and equitable remedies against the corporation's
directors by notice and formal request to them to correct what is
believed to be a violation of their duties to the shareholders. The
chancellor overruled the demurrer, and the supreme court affirmed
the chancellor's decree. The supreme court stated that the "charges
made in the bill that the defendant claimed to have kept no records
of business transactions after he acquired control of a majority of the
stock, and that the corporation was on the verge of bankruptcy all
of which was admitted to be true by the demurrer" are sufficient
grounds for maintaining the suit.2
A considerable part of the court's opinion was devoted to a discussion of the general rule, well established in Tennessee and elsewhere,
that a bill cannot be maintained by a shareholder for the use of the
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Louisiana and Georgia
Bars.
1. 310 S.W.2d 164 (Tern. 1958).
2. Id. at 168.
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corporation if a majority of the board of directors is competent and
qualified to act and no demand has been made on them to bring a
proper suit, and of the equally well-established exception to that rule
dispensing with the necessity for a demand upon corporate authorities
if the demand would be useless and unavailing in that it would be
refused or if granted the litigation would necessarily be under the
control of persons opposed to its success.
The court held that the instant case was controlled by the exception
rather than the rule. In this connection, it should be noted that the suit
was not a shareholders' derivative action and that strictly speaking a
discussion of the rule and its exception was not pertinent in this litigation, this being a suit by shareholders in their own behalf. Perhaps
what the court had in mind was that the same policy and business
considerations which support the rule requiring a shareholder to exhaust his corporate remedies before bringing a derivative action might
with some logic be held to apply also to a suit by a minority shareholder against the majority shareholder and principal executive officer
for a discovery and an accounting. But, if that was the thinking behind
the court's discussion of the rule, it probably should have found that
complainants had an adequate remedy within the corporation and
dismissed complainants' bill for complainants constituted a majority
of the corporation's board of directors. Assuming that the corporation's
charter or by-laws did not contain a provision permitting the majority
shareholder to remove board members without cause before the end
of their term, complainants, if necessary, could have taken over the
management of the corporation for the remainder of their term, removing defendant from his positions as president and treasurer.
Though the court's reasoning may be subject to criticism on technical grounds, the result that it reached is clearly a desirable one. In
most close corporations, paper work is neglected and few if any corporate records are kept. There may be a fragmentary file of corporation minutes, but that file will often be limited to copies of a few
resolutions required by the exigencies of business, such as resolutions
required by banks for the opening of checking accounts and resolutions
required for the passage of title to real property. 3 Not uncommonly
the holders of a majority of the voting shares take complete control
of the corporation, "run the show" themselves, appoint themselves
or their nominees to corporate offices, drain off the corporation's earnings in salaries, and refuse to give minority shareholders any information at all about the corporation's affairs or how its business is being
conducted. The minority shareholders' right to inspect the corporation's books and records is, as a practical matter, often useless, because
there are no corporate books and records; and even where books and
3. See O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 8.02 (1958).
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records exist it is doubtful whether shareholders are privileged to
inspect the corporation's property to determine whether the corporation's assets actually are accurately reflected on its books.4 The court
in the instant case gave minority shareholders who had been frozen
out a very effective way of obtaining information about the corporation's affairs. In making its decision, the court emphasized that it was
dealing with a corporation in which complainants and defendant
owned all of the stock and constituted the full membership of the
board of directors, 5 perhaps intimating that another result might have
been called for if this had been a public issue corporation. In other
words, the Supreme Court of Tennessee, just as courts in other jurisdictions, found that close corporations have characteristics and needs
separate and distinct from those of public issue corporations and that
the rules applicable to public issue corporations should not necessarily
be applied to close corporations.
DisregardingCorporate Entity in Close Corporation:The close corporation, just as the public issue corporation, is generally viewed as
a "legal entity" having in law an existence separate and apart from
its shareholders. This means that rights, duties and other legal relations arising out of an incorporated enterprise, irrespective of whether
it is widely held or closely held, are usually adjusted as though the
corporation is a separate legal person. A corporation's separate legal
personality is said not to be lost merely because all of its stock is
held by two or three persons, by the members of a single family, or
even by a single individual.6
In spite of this general adherence in theory to the notion that a
corporation whether widely or closely held is a legal entity, the courts
disregard a corporation's separate personality whenever they conclude
that the corporate form is being employed to evade an obligation, to
circumvent a statute, to perpetrate a fraud or crime, or to gairi an
unjust advantage or commit an injustice.7 Apparently the courts are
somewhat more ready to disregard a corporation's separate legal personality if it is closely held than if it is a public issue corporation. 8
Perhaps this readiness is due in part at least to the courts' awareness
of the superior opportunity which shareholders' in a close corporation
4. See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 164 (1946).
5. 310 S.W.2d at 167.
6. United States v. Weissman, 219 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1955); Commerce Trust
Co. v. Woodbury, 77 F.2d 478, 487 (8th Cir. 1935); Ross v. Biggs, 206 Miss. 542,
40 So. 2d 293 (1949); Springborn v. Anita Land Co., 101 N.E.2d 238 (Ohio
App. 1951).

7. See generally Annots., 1 A.L.R. 610 (1919), 34 A.L.R. 597 (1925).

8. See O'NFAL, CLOSE CORPoRATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.09 (1958);

RoHRLicH, ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BusNEss ENTERPRISES §

(rev. ed. 1953).

4.11 n. 72
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have to control corporate activities and manipulate corporate and
individual assets to the detriment of creditors and other outsiders.
A recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals, Sixth
Circuit, Thoni Trucking Co. v. Foster,9 illustrates the way in which
affairs of a close corporation are sometimes manipulated in an attempt
to injure corporate creditors. In that case Thoni owned all except two
of the corporation's shares, one share each being owned by Thoni's
wife and father. The three-man board of directors was composed of
Thoni and his wife and father. Shortly after Thoni learned of an
accident in Illinois (involving one of the corporation's trucks) in
which plaintiffs were injured, the board of directors took various steps
which resulted in stripping the corporation of all its assets. Substantial sums were paid to Thoni in the guise of salaries and dividends, and
the remaining assets and business operations of the corporation were
transferred to another company owned by Thoni. Further, Thoni
caused misleading correspondence to be sent to plaintiffs, first directing them to seek recovery from the corporation and later advising
them that the corporation was no longer operating and had no substantial assets. Plaintiffs, after recovering default judgments in a
state court in Illinois, brought suit in the Federal District Court for
the Middle District of Tennessee; and the district court held Thoni
personally liable for the amount of the Illinois judgments. On appeal,
the court of appeals affirmed, declaring that Thoni had utilized his
position of dominance and control over the corporation for the fraudulent purpose of depriving plaintiffs of their rightful recovery, and
holding that in this situation Tennessee law provides that the corporate entity may be disregarded.' 0
Legality of Bank's Lending Money to County School Board of
Which Its Presidentis a Member: The Tennessee Code" provides that
it shall be unlawful "for any officer, committeeman, director, or person
whose duty it is to vote for, let out, overlook, or in any manner to
superintend, any work of any contract in which any municipal corporation, county, or the state, shall or may be interested, to be directly
or indirectly interested" in the contract. In State v. Yoakum, 12 decided
by the Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Eastern Section, the Claiborne
County Bank, in which defendant owned controlling stock and of
9. 243 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1957).
10. Another recent federal court decision which may be of some interest to
Tennessee lawyers with a corporate practice is City of Nashville v. United
States, 155 F. Supp. 98 (M.D. Tenn., 1957), in which the court laid down among
others the following conclusion of law: the Interstate Commerce Commission
is empowered to authorize the merger of two or more railroads without regard
to the provisions of the laws of any state, except that state law (if any) may
govern the size of the stockholder vote required for approval of a merger.
11. TENN.CODE ANN.§ 12-401 (1956).
12. 306 S.W.2d 39 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1957).
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which he was president, loaned the school board the sum of $7,500.
The loan was repaid with interest. The chancellor found that the
loan was made in good faith as an accommodation to the school board
and not for profit, but held that in making the loan the defendant entered into a contractual relationship prohibited by the statute. The
court of appeals reversed the chancellor. After commenting that the
proceeds of the loan were placed on deposit in the bank and checked
out on a large number of checks the handling costs of which exceeded
the interest collected, the court held that a loan made in good faith
for a legitimate purpose at the legal rate of interest does not violate
the policy and purpose of the statute.
Quorum and Vote Requirements in General Welfare Corporations:
The Tennessee Code Annotated, title 48, chapter 111s provides .for the
organization and operation of general welfare corporations, i.e., corporations organized "for the general welfare of society" and not for
individual profit. Bedford County Hospital v. County of Bedford,14 a
recent decision of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Middle Section,
interprets some of the sections in this chapter of the code and lays
down rules on quorum and vote requirements for general welfare
corporations. The Bedford County Hospital decision is discussed here,
even though this article deals with business associations, because: (1)
a hospital, even when it is operated without a view to private profit,
is in a sense a business organization or at least its methods of operation
are quite similar to those of some business organizations; (2) the court
in its opinion expressly stated that members in a welfare corporation
"hold in the nature of stockholders in a private corporation"; 15 and
(3) what the court said here in interpreting the welfare corporation
statute and in laying down rules for welfare corporations may sometimes in the future throw light on what action the court will take on
questions involving private business corporations.
In the Bedford County Hospitalcase a welfare corporation organized
to operate a hospital brought a suit against Bedford County to cancel
a deed by which the corporation's assets had been transferred to the
county. The validity of the deed depended on the effect to be given
action authorizing the deed taken by a group which purported to be
the corporation's board of directors. The first corporation question
considered (a number of procedural questions and questions involving
jurisdiction of the chancery court were discussed first) was the validity of a meeting of the corporation's members at which the members
had supposedly elected a board and authorized the execution of the
deed. Construing together two sections of the statutes dealing with
13. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-1101, -1121 (1956).

14. 304 S.W.2d 697 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1957).
15. Id. at 700.
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welfare corporations, 16 the court concluded that the presence of the
holders of a majority of all voting power (voting power being calculated on the basis of one vote for each $100 contributed to corporate
capital, as provided in the corporation's charter)1 7 was necessary to
constitute a quorum, 18 and that therefore action taken at the members'
meeting was void for lack of a quorum.
The second corporation question considered by the court was
whether the group of persons claiming to be the board of directors had
the power to execute and deliver the deed. The court decided that
directors did not have that power, because: (1) a majority of the
members of the alleged board were not members of the corporation,
and the corporation's charter required that directors be members;
(2) at the time of the directors' resolution purporting to authorize
the deeding of the property, the total assets of a welfare corporation
could legally be transferred only to another welfare corporation, and
the county therefore was not qualified to receive the assets; and (3)
in any event (though the court admitted this holding was not necessary to its decision) the board of directors in authorizing the deed
exceeded the authority which had been conferred on it by the members.
Duty of Electric Membership Corporation to Furnish Services:
Another case involving a special type of corporation was Chumbley v.
Duck River Electric Membership Corp.,19 decided by the Supreme
Court of Tennessee. In that case the complainant filed a bill to compel
defendant to install electricity on complainant's property, on the
theory that defendant is a public service corporation and is under
obligation to furnish facilities to all inhabitants without discrimination. Defendant demurred on the ground that the bill alleged no fact
showing defendant to be subject to an obligation to furnish facilities.
The chancellor sustained the demurrer, and the supreme court
affirmed. The reasoning was as follows: if (under the allegation of the
bill) defendant is considered a public utility or public service corporation, defendant is not under a duty to extend its facilities unless and
16. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-1114, 48-1120 (1956).

17. This method of calculation was approved in spite of TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 48-1114 (1956), which provides in part that in elections each member is "to

be entitled to one (1) vote, either in person or by proxy, and the result to be
determined by a majority of the votes cast."
18. The rule applicable to business corporations is that in the absence of
express provision to the contrary in a statute or in a charter or by-law provision, any number of shareholders who may be present, provided there are
at least two (and assuming notice of the meeting has been given where required), constitutes a quorum for the transaction of business by the shareholders. Of course, by an express statutory provision or by charter or by-law
clause the quorum can be raised so as to require the presence of a majority of
the shareholders or of the holders of a majority of the voting power. See
BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 173 (1946).

19. 310 S.W.2d 453 (Tenn. 1958).
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until ordered to do so by the Tennessee Public Service Commission, in
which exclusive jurisdiction over this kind of question is exclusively
vested in the first instance; on the other hand, if (because defendant
is sued under the name and style of an electric membership corporation) the court were to take judicial notice of the fact that defendant
is an electric membership corporation, defendant is not under a duty
to extend its facilities to complainant, because complainant does not
aver that he is a member of the corporation or that he has complied
with the reasonable rules and regulations and has become entitled to
the privileges of membership.
Joint Ownership of Property and the Sharing of Gross Returns as
Indication of Partnership:The only case decided in Tennessee during
the survey period which raised a question of partnership law was
Mullins v. Evans,20 decided by the Court of Appeals of Tennessee,
Eastern Section. In that case a number of landowners entered into
a pooling agreement by which they conveyed unmined coal on their
properties to a trustee to facilitate the lease of the properties as a unit
for coal mining. The principal question in the case was whether
royalties for the mining of coal, accruing after the death of one of the
landowners, passed as realty to her heirs at law or as personalty to
her surviving husband. One of the arguments advanced by the husband was that the execution of the trust instrument by his landowning
wife and the subsequent execution of a lease by the trustee effected
an equitable conversion of the wife's interest from realty to personalty
and that she had only an interest in a mining partnership which descended as personalty to him as surviving husband. The court held
that the creation of the trust did not effect a conversion of the landowner's interest from realty to personalty. As to the partnership
question, the court pointed out that under the Uniform Partnership
Act applicable in Tennessee 2' the joint ownership of property or the
sharing of gross returns "whether or not the person sharing them
have a joint or common right or interest in any property from which
the returns are derived" does not of itself establish a partnership. 22
As the court could find no other circumstance supporting a partnership, and as the burden of proof was on the party alleging a partnership, the court held that the husband had not established his right to
receive the royalties.
20. 308 S.W.2d 494 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1957).
21. TENN. CODE ANN. § 61-106 (1956).
22. 308 S.W.2d at 498.

